Global Pandemic App Watch (GPAW)

COVID-19 Exposure Notification and Contact Tracing Apps

UPDATE CANCELLATION NOTICE: This database was last updated on December 31st, 2020 and will not be updated again. Please use this information accordingly. 

Below are interactive maps containing information about the exposure notification and contact tracing (ENACT) apps around the world. If you move your cursor over a coloured country, the map will display preliminary information about its app. If you would like to learn more about a specific country’s app, scroll down to the GPAW Data Table and select the country in which you are interested. You will be directed to that country’s individual page which contains more information and linked articles specific to that country and their app development.

The United States is not adopting a nationwide app, rather many states plan to develop and deploy their own ENACT app. To avoid classifying the whole country under one app, we created a separate page dedicated to ENACT apps in the United States.

These maps were generated using Flourish Studios on their Projection Map 5.5.0 template. As a result of the Flourish template the maps may contain some inconsistencies or technical glitches. Please do not rely on these maps for geographical accuracy but rather as aids to visualize the regions in which ENACT apps are deployed.

App Classification Map

In this map, apps are grouped into GAEN (Google/Apple Exposure Notification), OpenTrace, and Other. Each of the GAEN and OpenTrace code bases offer a different suite of capabilities representing different societal values and political cultures. The ‘Other’ category may be expanded into new code-bases in the future as GAEN and OpenTrace develop reputations based on their performance. 

Uptake (%) Map

The second map displays uptake as a percentage of population using a colour gradient. Our motivation for displaying this information is that we feel there may be something to learn about the nature of the civic culture and wider societal norms in each country based on a population’s collective uptake of an app. We suspect, for example that positive uptake will correlate with general trust among citizens in the government.

Voluntariness Map

The third map displays apps divided by the voluntariness of their downloads. As these apps are tested in real-time, we are interested to see if voluntary apps become involuntary if their effectiveness is proven. Also, we are interested to see what level of government persuasion is needed to show success in an app. 

GPAW Data Table

CountryApp NameTechnologyArchitechtureUptake (%)ImplementationClassificationVoluntariness
AustraliaCOVIDSafeQR Code + BluetoothCentralized25.76ImplementedOpenTraceVoluntary
AustriaStopp CoronaBluetoothDecentralized8.9ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
AzerbaijanCOVID izle----OtherVoluntary
BahrainBeAwareGPS + BluetoothCentralized62ImplementedOtherVoluntary
BelgiumCoronalertBluetoothDecentralized17.4Not Implemented YetGAEN Voluntary
BermudaWeHealth Bermuda AppBluetoothDecentralized-ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
BhutanDruk TraceQR CodeCentralized-ImplementedOtherVoluntary
BoliviaBolivia Segura----OtherVoluntary
BruneiBruHealthQR Code + BluetoothCentralized-ImplementedOtherVoluntary
BulgariaVirusafeGPSCentralized0.79ImplementedOtherVoluntary
BrazilCoronavírus SUSBluetoothDecentralized4.7ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
Cabo VerdeComVida----OtherVoluntary
CanadaCovid Alert BluetoothDecentralized15.2ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
ChinaOperates using WeChat and AlipayQR CodeCentralized-ImplementedOtherVoluntary
Costa RicaMascarilla DigitalBluetooth---OtherVoluntary
CyprusCovTracerGPSDecentralized0.77ImplementedOtherVoluntary
CzecheRouskaBluetoothDecentralized10ImplementedOtherVoluntary
DenmarkSmitteStopBluetoothDecentralized25.8ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
EcuadorASI----OtherVoluntary
EstoniaHOIABluetoothDecentralized10.8ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
FinlandKoronavilkkuBluetoothDecentralized40ImplementedOtherVoluntary
FijicareFijiBluetoothCentralized8-OtherVoluntary
FranceTousAntiCovidBluetoothCentralized7.5ImplementedOtherVoluntary
GeorgiaStopCovidGPS + BluetoothDecentralized--OtherVoluntary
GermanyCorona-Warn-AppQR Code + BluetoothDecentralized29.1ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
GhanaGH COVID-19 TrackerGPS--ImplementedOtherVoluntary
Hong KongLeave Home Safe----UnknownUnknown
HungaryVirusRadarBluetoothDecentralized - Centralized via consent0.9ImplementedOtherVoluntary
IcelandRakning C-19GPSDecentralized38.45ImplementedOtherVoluntary
IndiaAarogya SetuGPS + BluetoothDecentralized - Centralized via consent12.6ImplementedOtherVoluntary
IndonesiaPeduliLindungiGPS + BluetoothCentralized2ImplementedOtherVoluntary
IranAC19GPS-4.89ImplementedOtherVoluntary
IrelandCovid TrackerBluetoothDecentralized35ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
IndonesiaPeduliLindungiGPS + BluetoothCentralized2ImplementedOtherVoluntary
IsraelHaMagenGPS + BluetoothDecentralized16.7ImplementedOtherVoluntary
ItalyImmuniBluetoothDecentralized14.1ImplementedOtherVoluntary
JapanCOCOABluetoothDecentralized13.4ImplementedOtherVoluntary
JordanAmanGPSDecentralized10ImplementedOtherVoluntary
KazakhstanSaqbolBluetooth---OtherVoluntary
LatviaApturi CovidBluetoothDecentralized9.7ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
LebanonMa3anBluetoothDecentralized-ImplementedOtherVoluntary
LithuaniaKoronaStopLT----OtherVoluntary
MaltaCOVID Alert MaltaBluetoothDecentralized-Not Implemented YetGAEN Voluntary
MaldivesTrace EkeeBluetoothDecentralized - Centralized via consent-ImplementedOpenTraceVoluntary
Mexico CovidRadarQR Code + BluetoothCentralized-ImplementedOtherVoluntary
NetherlandsCovidRadarBluetoothDecentralized21.4ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
New ZealandNZ COVID TracerQR CodeCentralized42ImplementedOtherVoluntary
North MacedoniaStopKoronaBluetoothCentralized-ImplementedOtherVoluntary
Northern IrelandStopCOVID NIBluetoothDecentralized-ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
NorwaySmittestoppGPS + BluetoothCentralized26.58Implemented and removedOtherVoluntary
PakistanCoCareQR Code + Bluetooth--ImplementedOtherVoluntary
PhilippinesStaySafeBluetoothDecentralized2ImplementedOtherVoluntary
PolandProteGOBluetoothDecentralized1.9ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
PortugalStayaway CovidBluetoothDecentralized20ImplementedOtherVoluntary
QatarEhterazGPS + BluetoothCentralized91ImplementedOtherInvoluntary
SaudiArabiaTawakkalna/TabaudGPS + BluetoothDecentralized-ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
ScotlandProtect ScotlandBluetoothDecentralized27.7ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
SierraLeone Health Outbreak Manager (HOM)GPS + BluetoothCentralized-Not Implemented YetGAEN Voluntary
SingaporeTraceTogether is the official name and the Open Source derivative is called Open TraceBluetoothDecentralized - Centralized via consent40ImplementedOpenTraceVoluntary
SlovakiaCovid 19 ZostanZdravyGPS + BluetoothCentralized-ImplementedOtherVoluntary
Slovenia#OstaniZdravBluetoothDecentralized-ImplementedOtherVoluntary
SouthAfricaCOVID Alert SABluetoothDecentralized1ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
SpainRadar Covid AppBluetoothDecentralized10ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
Sri LankaStaySafeQR CodeCentralized-ImplementedOtherVoluntary
SwitzerlandSwissCovidBluetoothDecentralized33.333333333333ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
ThailandMorChanaQR Code + Bluetooth + GPSDecentralized5.11ImplementedOtherVoluntary
TogoTogo SafeGPS + BluetoothCentralized-ImplementedOtherVoluntary
TunisiaE7miGPS + BluetoothCentralized-ImplementedOtherVoluntary
TurkeyCoronawarnerGPS + Bluetooth--ImplementedOtherVoluntary
UAETraceCovidBluetoothDecentralized-ImplementedOtherVoluntary
United KingdomNHS COVID-19 AppQR Code + BluetoothDecentralized29.4 (UK); 34.3 (England & Wales)ImplementedGAEN Voluntary
Various Apps----VariousVoluntary
UruguayCoronavirusUYBluetoothDecentralized--GAEN Voluntary
VietnamBlueZoneBluetoothDecentralized21ImplementedOtherVoluntary

Research Perspective

Design Choices

The development of COVID-19 Exposure Notification and Contact Tracing Apps (ENACT Apps) is placing governments, corporations, and citizens around the world into an ongoing ethical design experiment resulting in potentially life-saving outcomes but also potential risks. During the summer of 2020, design teams and technology corporations presented governments  with a variety of technological solutions in the form of ENACT apps. Government leaders and ordinary citizens have needed to make decisions about which options to endorse and how to govern their use. We have gathered data on this decision-making, primarily from publicly available information sources. The criteria we used to select news stories and other information were: (1) prominence of issues being covered by the news, opinion pieces, and scholarly articles; and (2) our early analysis of this information.

The dataset which informs this mapping exercise was informed not just by these selection criteria but also data availability. Uptake numbers are difficult to find. The main source we used to get a sense of uptake is number of downloads, which is only publicly reported by the Google Play store and in the media. In both cases, the values are generally imprecise and often do not account for user uninstallation. In this way, ENACT apps offer an interesting case study in knowledge mobilization in a time of crisis. App developers and governments need to determine the minimum amount of information to  make publicly available regarding app uptake, use and efficacy; such information will influence research like this website but also everyday decisions about downloading and using apps. Considerations include the privacy-preserving aspects of the appwhich often have both technical and legal dimensions.  

Key Gaps

We are restricted in our research by our geographical location and, by association, our limited understanding of foreign languages.  Many apps  and articles describing those apps are not offered in English or French. Translation technology was somewhat helpful,  however it is unreliable, especially for large documents.  

This website focuses  on  computer science and data governance data categories (architecture, uptake, technology, etc.).  Other areas we could have focused on include, but are not limited to: interoperability, legal  issues , effects on employment,  or  accessibility. While these areas are certainly covered in our research to some degree,  this final product does not display that information as readily as quantifiable data.  

Federal states can create challenges for categorizing the apps. For example, Canada currently has both a Federal and Provincial app (Alberta) although Alberta is expected to switch to the federal app. The US has some states with apps and some without. The UK has an NHSX app, but Scotland and Northern Ireland also  tested their own apps. Similarly, the EU has guidance on apps, but each member state dealt with their own app for the most part. Certain countries such as the Philippines also have multiple apps within their borders.  

Next Steps

Many of the ENACT apps covered in our research were released after their country’s worst Coronavirus spike and in between ‘waves’. As a result, many of these apps have not been adequately tested in the high-infection scenarios they were designed for. One of our research goals is to develop this platform to be ready to evaluate apps during a the imminent ‘second wave’. We are interested to see how app performance dictates uptake and how governments market their app against the backdrop of a ‘second wave’.

Many of the data fields on the website are empty. In any empty field, you will see “unknown” as a placeholder. Using a default “unknown” value is a deliberate positive data point indicating a missing data. We are interested to see if governments that withhold information regarding the performance of their app will be inadvertently discouraging its uptake and effectiveness. At the end of the pandemic, the “unknown” data fields may be more indicative of a particular government’s COVID-19 response than the populated fields.

Disclaimer

The information available has been gathered from news reports,  publicly available documents, and scholarly literature. Its accuracy is therefore subject to change. The information contained on this page is not globally comprehensive as the research team is constrained by language and geographical barriers.  Please use this information responsibly and contact us with any questions.

Interested in Collaborating?

If you would like to collaborate with our research team, or provide us with information, insights, or app-related images, please contact us here.

This project is partially funded by the Scotiabank Fund for AI and Society at the University of Ottawa

Suggested Citations

Canadian Guide to Uniform Legal Citation 9th Edition: Ryan Mosoff, Tommy Friedlich, Teresa Scassa, Kelly Bronson & Jason Millar,  “Global Pandemic App Watch (GPAW): COVID-19 Exposure Notification and Contact Tracing Apps” (20 September 2020), online: CRAiEDL https://craiedl.ca/gpaw/.

APA: Ryan Mosoff, Tommy Friedlich, Teresa Scassa, Kelly Bronson & Jason Millar. (2020). Global Pandemic App Watch (GPAW): COVID-19 Exposure Notification and Contact Tracing Apps. https://craiedl.ca/gpaw/

Last Updated: January 25, 2021