UPDATE CANCELLATION NOTICE: This database was last updated on December 31st, 2020 and will not be updated again. Please use this information accordingly.
Below are interactive maps containing information about the exposure notification and contact tracing (ENACT) apps around the world. If you move your cursor over a coloured country, the map will display preliminary information about its app. If you would like to learn more about a specific country’s app, scroll down to the GPAW Data Table and select the country in which you are interested. You will be directed to that country’s individual page which contains more information and linked articles specific to that country and their app development.
The United States is not adopting a nationwide app, rather many states plan to develop and deploy their own ENACT app. To avoid classifying the whole country under one app, we created a separate page dedicated to ENACT apps in the United States.
These maps were generated using Flourish Studios on their Projection Map 5.5.0 template. As a result of the Flourish template the maps may contain some inconsistencies or technical glitches. Please do not rely on these maps for geographical accuracy but rather as aids to visualize the regions in which ENACT apps are deployed.
In this map, apps are grouped into GAEN (Google/Apple Exposure Notification), OpenTrace, and Other. Each of the GAEN and OpenTrace code bases offer a different suite of capabilities representing different societal values and political cultures. The ‘Other’ category may be expanded into new code-bases in the future as GAEN and OpenTrace develop reputations based on their performance.
The second map displays uptake as a percentage of population using a colour gradient. Our motivation for displaying this information is that we feel there may be something to learn about the nature of the civic culture and wider societal norms in each country based on a population’s collective uptake of an app. We suspect, for example that positive uptake will correlate with general trust among citizens in the government.
The third map displays apps divided by the voluntariness of their downloads. As these apps are tested in real-time, we are interested to see if voluntary apps become involuntary if their effectiveness is proven. Also, we are interested to see what level of government persuasion is needed to show success in an app.
Country | App Name | Technology | Architechture | Uptake (%) | Implementation | Classification | Voluntariness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Australia | COVIDSafe | QR Code + Bluetooth | Centralized | 25.76 | Implemented | OpenTrace | Voluntary |
Austria | Stopp Corona | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 8.9 | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Azerbaijan | COVID izle | - | - | - | - | Other | Voluntary |
Bahrain | BeAware | GPS + Bluetooth | Centralized | 62 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Belgium | Coronalert | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 17.4 | Not Implemented Yet | GAEN | Voluntary |
Bermuda | WeHealth Bermuda App | Bluetooth | Decentralized | - | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Bhutan | Druk Trace | QR Code | Centralized | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Bolivia | Bolivia Segura | - | - | - | - | Other | Voluntary |
Brunei | BruHealth | QR Code + Bluetooth | Centralized | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Bulgaria | Virusafe | GPS | Centralized | 0.79 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Brazil | Coronavírus SUS | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 4.7 | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Cabo Verde | ComVida | - | - | - | - | Other | Voluntary |
Canada | Covid Alert | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 15.2 | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
China | Operates using WeChat and Alipay | QR Code | Centralized | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Costa Rica | Mascarilla Digital | Bluetooth | - | - | - | Other | Voluntary |
Cyprus | CovTracer | GPS | Decentralized | 0.77 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Czech | eRouska | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 10 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Denmark | SmitteStop | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 25.8 | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Ecuador | ASI | - | - | - | - | Other | Voluntary |
Estonia | HOIA | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 10.8 | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Finland | Koronavilkku | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 40 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Fiji | careFiji | Bluetooth | Centralized | 8 | - | Other | Voluntary |
France | TousAntiCovid | Bluetooth | Centralized | 7.5 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Georgia | StopCovid | GPS + Bluetooth | Decentralized | - | - | Other | Voluntary |
Germany | Corona-Warn-App | QR Code + Bluetooth | Decentralized | 29.1 | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Ghana | GH COVID-19 Tracker | GPS | - | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Hong Kong | Leave Home Safe | - | - | - | - | Unknown | Unknown |
Hungary | VirusRadar | Bluetooth | Decentralized - Centralized via consent | 0.9 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Iceland | Rakning C-19 | GPS | Decentralized | 38.45 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
India | Aarogya Setu | GPS + Bluetooth | Decentralized - Centralized via consent | 12.6 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Indonesia | PeduliLindungi | GPS + Bluetooth | Centralized | 2 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Iran | AC19 | GPS | - | 4.89 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Ireland | Covid Tracker | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 35 | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Indonesia | PeduliLindungi | GPS + Bluetooth | Centralized | 2 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Israel | HaMagen | GPS + Bluetooth | Decentralized | 16.7 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Italy | Immuni | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 14.1 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Japan | COCOA | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 13.4 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Jordan | Aman | GPS | Decentralized | 10 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Kazakhstan | Saqbol | Bluetooth | - | - | - | Other | Voluntary |
Latvia | Apturi Covid | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 9.7 | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Lebanon | Ma3an | Bluetooth | Decentralized | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Lithuania | KoronaStopLT | - | - | - | - | Other | Voluntary |
Malta | COVID Alert Malta | Bluetooth | Decentralized | - | Not Implemented Yet | GAEN | Voluntary |
Maldives | Trace Ekee | Bluetooth | Decentralized - Centralized via consent | - | Implemented | OpenTrace | Voluntary |
Mexico | CovidRadar | QR Code + Bluetooth | Centralized | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Netherlands | CovidRadar | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 21.4 | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
New Zealand | NZ COVID Tracer | QR Code | Centralized | 42 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
North Macedonia | StopKorona | Bluetooth | Centralized | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Northern Ireland | StopCOVID NI | Bluetooth | Decentralized | - | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Norway | Smittestopp | GPS + Bluetooth | Centralized | 26.58 | Implemented and removed | Other | Voluntary |
Pakistan | CoCare | QR Code + Bluetooth | - | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Philippines | StaySafe | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 2 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Poland | ProteGO | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 1.9 | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Portugal | Stayaway Covid | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 20 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Qatar | Ehteraz | GPS + Bluetooth | Centralized | 91 | Implemented | Other | Involuntary |
SaudiArabia | Tawakkalna/Tabaud | GPS + Bluetooth | Decentralized | - | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Scotland | Protect Scotland | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 27.7 | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
SierraLeone | Health Outbreak Manager (HOM) | GPS + Bluetooth | Centralized | - | Not Implemented Yet | GAEN | Voluntary |
Singapore | TraceTogether is the official name and the Open Source derivative is called Open Trace | Bluetooth | Decentralized - Centralized via consent | 40 | Implemented | OpenTrace | Voluntary |
Slovakia | Covid 19 ZostanZdravy | GPS + Bluetooth | Centralized | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Slovenia | #OstaniZdrav | Bluetooth | Decentralized | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
SouthAfrica | COVID Alert SA | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 1 | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Spain | Radar Covid App | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 10 | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Sri Lanka | StaySafe | QR Code | Centralized | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Switzerland | SwissCovid | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 33.333333333333 | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Thailand | MorChana | QR Code + Bluetooth + GPS | Decentralized | 5.11 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Togo | Togo Safe | GPS + Bluetooth | Centralized | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Tunisia | E7mi | GPS + Bluetooth | Centralized | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
Turkey | Coronawarner | GPS + Bluetooth | - | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
UAE | TraceCovid | Bluetooth | Decentralized | - | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
United Kingdom | NHS COVID-19 App | QR Code + Bluetooth | Decentralized | 29.4 (UK); 34.3 (England & Wales) | Implemented | GAEN | Voluntary |
Various Apps | - | - | - | - | Various | Voluntary | |
Uruguay | CoronavirusUY | Bluetooth | Decentralized | - | - | GAEN | Voluntary |
Vietnam | BlueZone | Bluetooth | Decentralized | 21 | Implemented | Other | Voluntary |
The development of COVID-19 Exposure Notification and Contact Tracing Apps (ENACT Apps) is placing governments, corporations, and citizens around the world into an ongoing ethical design experiment resulting in potentially life-saving outcomes but also potential risks. During the summer of 2020, design teams and technology corporations presented governments with a variety of technological solutions in the form of ENACT apps. Government leaders and ordinary citizens have needed to make decisions about which options to endorse and how to govern their use. We have gathered data on this decision-making, primarily from publicly available information sources. The criteria we used to select news stories and other information were: (1) prominence of issues being covered by the news, opinion pieces, and scholarly articles; and (2) our early analysis of this information.
The dataset which informs this mapping exercise was informed not just by these selection criteria but also data availability. Uptake numbers are difficult to find. The main source we used to get a sense of uptake is number of downloads, which is only publicly reported by the Google Play store and in the media. In both cases, the values are generally imprecise and often do not account for user uninstallation. In this way, ENACT apps offer an interesting case study in knowledge mobilization in a time of crisis. App developers and governments need to determine the minimum amount of information to make publicly available regarding app uptake, use and efficacy; such information will influence research like this website but also everyday decisions about downloading and using apps. Considerations include the privacy-preserving aspects of the app, which often have both technical and legal dimensions.
We are restricted in our research by our geographical location and, by association, our limited understanding of foreign languages. Many apps and articles describing those apps are not offered in English or French. Translation technology was somewhat helpful, however it is unreliable, especially for large documents.
This website focuses on computer science and data governance data categories (architecture, uptake, technology, etc.). Other areas we could have focused on include, but are not limited to: interoperability, legal issues , effects on employment, or accessibility. While these areas are certainly covered in our research to some degree, this final product does not display that information as readily as quantifiable data.
Federal states can create challenges for categorizing the apps. For example, Canada currently has both a Federal and Provincial app (Alberta) although Alberta is expected to switch to the federal app. The US has some states with apps and some without. The UK has an NHSX app, but Scotland and Northern Ireland also tested their own apps. Similarly, the EU has guidance on apps, but each member state dealt with their own app for the most part. Certain countries such as the Philippines also have multiple apps within their borders.
Many of the ENACT apps covered in our research were released after their country’s worst Coronavirus spike and in between ‘waves’. As a result, many of these apps have not been adequately tested in the high-infection scenarios they were designed for. One of our research goals is to develop this platform to be ready to evaluate apps during a the imminent ‘second wave’. We are interested to see how app performance dictates uptake and how governments market their app against the backdrop of a ‘second wave’.
Many of the data fields on the website are empty. In any empty field, you will see “unknown” as a placeholder. Using a default “unknown” value is a deliberate positive data point indicating a missing data. We are interested to see if governments that withhold information regarding the performance of their app will be inadvertently discouraging its uptake and effectiveness. At the end of the pandemic, the “unknown” data fields may be more indicative of a particular government’s COVID-19 response than the populated fields.
The information available has been gathered from news reports, publicly available documents, and scholarly literature. Its accuracy is therefore subject to change. The information contained on this page is not globally comprehensive as the research team is constrained by language and geographical barriers. Please use this information responsibly and contact us with any questions.
If you would like to collaborate with our research team, or provide us with information, insights, or app-related images, please contact us here.
This project is partially funded by the Scotiabank Fund for AI and Society at the University of Ottawa
Canadian Guide to Uniform Legal Citation 9th Edition: Ryan Mosoff, Tommy Friedlich, Teresa Scassa, Kelly Bronson & Jason Millar, “Global Pandemic App Watch (GPAW): COVID-19 Exposure Notification and Contact Tracing Apps” (20 September 2020), online: CRAiEDL https://craiedl.ca/gpaw/.
APA: Ryan Mosoff, Tommy Friedlich, Teresa Scassa, Kelly Bronson & Jason Millar. (2020). Global Pandemic App Watch (GPAW): COVID-19 Exposure Notification and Contact Tracing Apps. https://craiedl.ca/gpaw/